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Sixty-four kindergarten children received tests of quantitative identity and quantita- 
tive equivalence for the conservations of number and continuous quantity. Two types 
of identity trials were included: a standard version using a single stimulus, and a 
modified version which paralleled the equivalence task in its use of two stimuli. In 
addition, half of the children were asked two questions on each trial (one preceding 
and one following the transformation), whereas half were asked only the 
post-transformation question. Neither the number of stimuli used nor the number of 
questions asked had any effect on performance. In contrast to some previous 
reports, tests of quantitative identity were no easier than tests of quantitative 
equivalence. It was concluded that the identity-equivalence decalage. if it exists at 
all, is less important than previous authors have claimed. 
In a typical conservation-of-number task (e.g., Piaget. 1952). the child is 
shown two rows with equal numbers of objects, lined up in one-to-one 
correspondence. After the child has agreed to the equality. one of the rows 
is spread out, creating the appearance of unequal numbers. The child is 
then asked whether the rows still contain the same number of objects. 
Elkind (1967) was the first to note that this task actually taps two 
somewhat distinct kinds of knowledge. The child who answers correctly 
has presumably realized that the number of objects in the transformed row 
has not been altered by the change in perceptual appearance. This 
understanding, labeled quuntitati~r ide~ity. is the ability stressed in 
Piaget’s theory. In the typical test, however, the child is never asked 
directly about the identity of the transformed row: instead. the question 
concerns the relati\~e number of objects in the two rows. The realization 
that the two rows still contain equal numbers is referred to as quantituti~~e 
equivalence. 
The point of Elkind’s distinction is that an understanding of identity 
would seem to be a necessary but not sufficient basis for solution of the 
equivalence problem. What must be added to the recognition of identity is a 
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kind of transitive inference: The two rows were the same to start with, the 
transformed row still has the same number of objects as it did at the start 
(this is the identity component), therefore the transformed row still has the 
same number as the nontransformed row (the equivalence component). 
Given the need for this additional deductive step, it may be that the 
equivalence task underestimates the child’s actual ability to conserve. 
Perhaps children would perform better if they were given a direct test of 
quantitative identity. It should be noted that the issue here is not simply the 
establishment of accurate age norms for the mastery of conservation. 
Rather, the question of when conservation first emerges is related to central 
Piagetian claims concerning sequences and concurrences in the develop- 
ment of concepts. 
Since Elkind’s article, there have been eleven reported studies 
comparing the relative difficulty of identity tasks and equivalence tasks in 
samples of normal children. The results have been mixed. In seven studies 
there has been some (although often weak) support for the hypothesis that 
identity develops earlier than equivalence (Elkind & Schoenfeld, 1972: 
Hooper, 1969a, b; Papalia & Hooper, 1971; Rybash, Roodin, & Sullivan, 
1975: Schwartz & Scholnick, 1970; Toniolo & Hooper, Note 1). Four other 
studies reported no differences between the two concepts (Koshinsky & 
Hall, 1973; Moynahan & Glick. 1972; Murray, 1970; Northman & Gruen, 
1970). 
In a recent review, Brainerd and Hooper (1975) conclude that studies 
which support the identity-equivalence sequence give a more accurate 
picture of development than those which fail to support it. The latter set of 
studies is said to suffer from two methodological flaws: the requirement of 
a verbal explanation as part of the criterion for conservation, and a 
concentration on subjects old enough to pass any version of the 
conservation test. As discussed in more detail elsewhere (Miller, in press), 
neither of these variables in fact provides a very satisfactory explanation 
for the discrepant results. The choice of a judgments-only or a 
judgments-plus-explanations criterion appears to have little effect on the 
comparison of identity and equivalence. And in none of the nonsupportive 
studies is there any suggestion that ceiling effects have masked a true 
identity-equivalence sequence. In addition, at least two of the supportive 
studies have methodological problems which Brainerd and Hooper fail to 
note. Specifically. the nonverbal assessment technique in the Schwartz and 
Scholnick (1970) study is appropriate only for equivalence, not for identity, 
and the Toniolo and Hooper (Note 1) study is rendered suspect by the 
ambiguous wording of the equivalence question (a wording that is 
incorrectly reported by Brainerd and Hooper. 1975: see Miller, in press, for 
a fuller discussion). 
The question of whether identity precedes equivalence in development 
thus remains unresolved. Also unresolved is the question of why the two 
tasks differ in difficulty, if in fact they do. Theorizing to date has focused on 
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Elkind’s (1967) contention that the equivalence task involves an additional 
deductive step that is not required for identity. There are. however, at least 
two other potentially important ways in which equivalence problems differ 
from identity problems. First, the perceptual pull toward nonconservation 
is almost certainly greater for equivalence than for identity. In the former 
task the child is confronted with two perceptually discrepant stimuli at the 
time of the conservation question, whereas in the latter task only one 
stimulus is present. The nonconservation illusion on an identity trial is 
dependent on the child’s comparison of the transformed stimulus with his 
trzemor!: of the stimulus prior to the transformation. It may be that the 
weaker illusion on the identity problem is what accounts for its greater ease. 
The other difference between the two paradigms concerns the number of 
questions asked. An identity test requires just one question, asked after the 
stimulus has been transformed. An equivalence test typically involves two 
questions: a pretransformation question to establish the initial equality of 
the two stimuli. and the post-transformation conservation question. Rose 
and Blank (1974) have recently reported that children perform better on the 
equivalence test if the initial question is omitted and only the final 
conservation question is asked. Their explanation for this finding is that 
children who are asked two questions interpret the second question as a 
sign that they should change their original answer. Since the original 
judgment was one of “same,” the result would be a bias toward 
nonconservation. This effect is great enough in the Rose and Blank study to 
suggest that it alone might account for the reported differences between 
identity and equivalence. 
In the present study, possible effects of the degree of perceptual illusion 
are examined through the inclusion of identity trials which use two stimuli 
and which are therefore perceptually identical to the equivalence trials. All 
children receive trials of this sort as well as standard identity and 
equivalence trials. Possible effects of the number of questions are 
examined through the assignment of children to one of two experimental 
conditions. In one condition only one question is asked on all trials (both 
identity and equivalence). whereas in the second condition two questions 
are asked on all trials. The concepts studied are conservation of number and 
conservation of continuous quantity. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 64 kindergarten children (mean age = 5 years, 1 I 
months). drawn from a predominantly lower-middle-class school in 
southeastern Michigan. Three additional children were rejected because of 
failure to pass the verbal pretest. The final sample included 16 boys and 16 
girls in each of the two experimental conditions. All of the children were 
white. 
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Procedure 
The experimenter was a white, college-aged female. As a guard against 
possible experimenter bias. the tester was not informed of any of the 
hypotheses underlying the study. 
Verbal pretest. The session began with a verbal pretest designed to 
assure that the child understood the terms that would be used on the 
conservation trials. The first pretest trial dealt with number and the second 
with quantity. Stimuli for the first trial were 495cm cardboard squares; 
stimuli for the second trial were wooden blocks. On both trials, the child 
was asked to compare a given stimulus with stimuli which were equal to it 
on the quantitative dimension in question, greater than it. and less than it. 
For example, the number trial required the child to compare agroup of two 
squares successively with groups of two squares, three squares, and one 
square. The form of the question was the same as that on the later 
conservation trials: “Are there the same number of squares here as there 
are here, or are there more squares here than there are here, or are there 
less squares here than there are here?” (On half the trials the order of the 
phrases was “more,” “less,” “same.“) 
Any child who failed a question was given correction, followed by a 
second trial (using different stimuli from those on the first trial) for the 
quantitative dimension on which he had failed. Children who failed the 
second trial for either of the two dimensions were eliminated from the 
study. 
Conserr,ation test. Each child received three trials for conservation of 
number and three for conservation of liquid quantity. The order of the 
number and quantity trials was balanced across subjects. Within each 
concept the three trials consisted of an identity problem with one stimulus, 
an identity problem with two stimuli, and an equivalence problem. The 
equivalence problem came first for half the subjects and last for the other 
half. The order of the two forms of identity problem was balanced across 
subjects. For a particular subject. the ordering of the three types of problem 
was the same for number as for quantity. 
Half of the children were assigned to the One-Question experimental 
condition and half to the Two-Questions condition. The procedure is 
described with respect to the One-Question condition, after which the 
differences for the Two-Questions condition are noted. 
The stimuli for the number trials were 14 red poker chips, a 54 x 70-cm 
yellow posterboard, and two 4.5 x 70-cm strips of white posterboard 
which could be laid horizontally across the center of the yellow board. The 
strips of white board were marked off with two vertical ink lines 36 cm 
apart. These lines served to mark the endpoints for the rows of chips. On 
trials with one row only one strip was used; on trials with two rows both 
strips were used. 
All trials began with the experimenter saying, “Watch what I do.” The 
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one-stimulus identity trial proceeded with the experimenter laying out 
seven chips on the white strip. The chips were left in place for a few 
seconds, after which the experimenter simultaneously moved the chips off 
the white board to the yellow and either spread them or bunched them. (The 
two transformations alternated from trial to trial and appeared equally 
often for each of the three trials.) The child was then asked, “Are there the 
same number of chips here [pointing to the transformed row] as there 
were here [pointing to the white strip], or are there more chips here than 
there were here, or are there less chips here than there were here?” (On half 
the trials the order of the phrases was “more,” “less,” “same.“) 
Following his judgment. the child was asked, “Why do you think so?” 
The tnw-stimuli identity trial began with the experimenter laying out two 
rows of seven chips, lined up in one-to-one correspondence on the two 
white strips. After a delay of a few seconds, one of the rows was 
transformed in the manner described above and the same question was 
asked. Again, each phrase of the question was accompanied by gestures 
indicating which row was being referred to. 
The equivalence trial was identical in physical arrangement to the 
two-stimuli trial just described. In this case. however, the question 
concerned the equivalence of the two rows: “Are there the same number of 
chips here [pointing to the transformed row] as there are here [pointing to 
the nontransformed row]. or are there more chips here than there are here. 
or are there less chips here than there are here?” On both this and the 
preceding trial, the white strips were moved apart prior to the 
transformation and the transformed row ended up between the two strips. 
Thus, on both trials the stimuli that the child was asked about were adjacent 
at the time of the question. 
The stimuli for the liquid quantity trials consisted of colored water and 
four plastic beakers. Two of the beakers (the standards) were 14 cm tall and 
10.5 cm wide. The remaining beakers were 28 cm tall by 7.5 cm wide and 7.5 
cm tall by 15 cm wide. The two standard beakers contained water-level 
markings on the side that was presented to the child. The water was always 
poured to the top mark. 1.3 cm from the top of the beaker. 
The one-stimulus identity trial began with the experimenter’s “Watch 
what I do,” followed by the filling of one of the standard containers. After a 
pause. the water was poured into either the taller or the shorter beaker 
(again, the two transformations were used equally often on each of the 
three trials). The wording of the conservation question was the same as that 
for number. with the substitution of “same amount of water” for “same 
number of chips.” 
As on the number problems, the trrwstimufi identity and the equivalence 
trials were physically identical. Each began with the filling of two standard 
containers to the same level. followed by the emptying of one into either the 
taller or the shorter beaker. The trials differed in whether an identity or an 
equivalence question was asked. The taller or shorter beaker was always 
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placed between the two standards at the time of the conservation question, 
thus permitting a comparison of adjacent beakers for both identity and 
equivalence. 
The basic difference between the procedure just described and the 
Two-Questions condition was that children under the latter condition were 
asked two questions on each trial, one preceding and one following the 
transformation. On the four trials which began with two equal stimuli (i.e., 
the equivalence and two-stimuli identity trials), the first question was the 
standard one to establish the initial equality of the stimuli. The wording was 
the same as that for the final conservation question. If the child did not 
agree to the initial equality, the stimuli were adjusted until agreement was 
reached. 
The two one-stimulus identity trials did not present a pair of equal stimuli 
about which the child could be questioned prior to the transformation. The 
initial question on these trials was made possible through movement of the 
stimuli from the standard starting state to an identical second standard. 
Thus. for number, the row of seven chips was simply moved from one white 
strip to an identical arrangement on the other white strip, and the 
conservation question was asked. Similarly, for water, the contents of one 
standard were emptied into an identical second standard. After the child’s 
response to the first question, the conservation transformation was 
performed and the final question was asked. 
Scoring 
Two judges independently rated the explanations that accompanied 
correct conservation judgments. Explanations from the following 
categories were considered adequate: addition/subtraction, inversion, 
compensation, previous equality, irrelevancy of transformation, and (for 
number only) one-to-one correspondence and counting or reference to 
absolute number. The percentage of agreement with respect to adequacy of 
explanation was 96%. 
RESULTS 
Performance on the conservation trials is summarized in Table 1. The 
results are presented in terms of two criteria: proportion of trials with 
correct judgments, and proportion of trials with correct judgments 
accompanied by adequate explanations. Analyses were carried out using 
both criteria. 
The design of the study included the between-subject factors of condition 
(One Question vs Two Questions) and sex and the within-subject factors of 
concept (number vs quantity) and type of trial. The dichotomous nature of 
performance at the level of specific trial precluded a single overall analysis 
of variance. Consequently, two main sets of analyses were performed: 
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TABLE I 
PROPORTION OF CORRECT ANSWERS AND CORRECT ANSWERS 









2 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance on the factors of condition, sex. and 
concept, and a series of Cochran Q tests to examine the effects of type of 
trial. 
The analyses of variance revealed no statistically significant effects as a 
function of condition, sex, concept, or the interactions among these factors 
(allp ‘s > .lO). As Table 1 indicates, correct judgments were slightly more 
frequent under the Two-Questions condition than under the One-Question 
condition, a direction of difference opposite to that obtained by Rose and 
Blank (1974). The difference, however. was well short of statistical 
significance [F(1,60 = 1.12, p > .25]. Correct answers were also more 
frequent on number trials than on quantity trials, but again the difference 
did not approach significance [F( 1.60 = 1.86. p > . lo]. Finally. the 
performance of the two sexes was virtually identical: 46% correct answers 
for boys, 48% for girls. 
Comparisons among the three types of trial were carried out both for 
each concept separately and for both concepts combined, yielding a total of 
six Cochran Q tests (i.e., tests for number, quantity, and number-quantity 
combined, using both a judgments-only and ajudgments-plus-explanations 
criterion). For the combined tests. the children’s performance was 
categorized as either passing both instances of a given type of trial or 
not passing both instances. On none of the six tests did the differences 
among trials approach statistical significance (the largest x2 was 2.67, for 
correct judgments on the number trials). Thus, there was no evidence that 
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the number of stimuli with which the child had to deal affected the difficulty 
of the identity task. Nor was there any evidence that a mastery of identity 
developed earlier than a mastery of equivalence. 
DISCUSSION 
This study tested two possible explanations for reported differences 
between quantitative identity and quantitative equivalence. Equivalence 
tasks have typically presented two perceptually discrepant stimuli at the 
time of the conservation question, whereas identity tasks have presented 
only one stimulus. The current results indicate that the number of stimuli 
does not affect the difficulty of the task. This finding is in accord with data 
from studies by Hooper (1969b) and Koshinsky and Hall (19731, both of 
which used screening of the nontransformed standard to equate the 
perceptual demands of identity and equivalence tasks. Thus, although most 
comparisons of identity and equivalence have failed to equate the degree of 
perceptual illusion, the available evidence suggests that this variable is not 
an important contributor to differences in difficulty. 
The second variable examined was the number of questions asked. Rose 
and Blank (1974) had reported that a one-question version of the 
equivalence task was considerably easier than the standard two-questions 
version. This result was not replicated here: in fact, the mean differences 
were in the opposite direction. The present results offer no support for the 
hypothesis that asking a second question biases the child toward a 
nonconservation judgment. It follows that there is also no support for the 
hypothesis that such a bias could account for reported differences between 
identity and equivalence. 
The discussion thus far has considered two possible explanations for 
differences between identity and equivalence. The major finding of the 
study, however, was that no such differences existed. Neither within nor 
across conditions was there any statistically significant evidence to indicate 
that identity problems were easier than equivalence problems. This 
conclusion also holds if the analysis is limited to trials which presented 
these problems in their typical form, i.e., identity trials with one stimulus 
and one question, and equivalence trials with two questions. The former 
sort of trial yielded 42% correct responding; the latter sort. 44%. 
As noted earlier, Brainerd and Hooper (1975) propose two explanations 
for apparent disconfirmations of the identity-equivalence sequence: 
testing of subjects too developmentally mature to show the sequence, and 
use of a judgments-plus-explanations criterion. Neither of these explana- 
tions can account for the present results. The figures in Table 1 indicate 
clearly that ceiling effects were not a problem. The sample was, in fact, at 
an ideal level for finding differences among trials. if the trials in fact differed 
in difficulty. Of the 64 subjects. 38 were inconsistent in their performance, 
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neither passing nor failing all of the trials. There was. then, ample 
variability in performance; the variability, however, did not relate 
systematically to the nature of the trial. 
The choice of a particular criterion for conservation proved to be 
unimportant. It is true that mean differences by the judgments-only 
criterion favored the identity tasks, whereas the differences disappeared or 
were reversed with judgments plus explanations as the criterion. 
Obviously, children found it more difficult to explain their correct 
judgments on identity trials than on equivalence trials. By neither criterion, 
however, did the differences between identity and equivalence approach 
statistical significance. 
The conclusion from Brainerd and Hooper’s ( 197.5) review was that the use 
of the equivalence paradigm may seriously underestimate the child’s ability 
to conserve. This concern appears to be overstated. It is probably the case 
that some children do find identity tasks easier than equivalence tasks: 
there are, after all, logical, perceptual. and linguistic bases for such an 
effect. Even in studies which report a difference. however, the difference is 
often quite small. There are, moreover, a substantial number of studies 
which find no difference at all. A reasonable conclusion is that for most 
children identity and equivalence are contemporaneous developmental 
achievements. 
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